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lthough a federal court in Florida has allowed a
state challenge to the constitutionality of
health care reform to proceed to the next stage of
litigation,1 a second federal court in Michigan has
already swiftly dispatched identical claims on the merits. In rejecting the plaintiffs’ claim, in
Thomas More Law Center et al. v. Barack
Hussein Obama et al., that the 2010
health care reform is unconstitutional, Judge George Steeh wrote
on October 7 that according to a
wealth of U.S. Supreme Court
precedent, Congress’s power to
regulate individual activity under
the Commerce Clause (in this
case, through a mandate that
individuals obtain health insurance) rests on whether the activity amounts to an “integral part
of a broader regulatory statutory
scheme that permissibly regulates interstate commerce.”2 In
this regard, Steeh’s opinion contains two central and intertwined
conclusions. First, “economic de-

cisions as to how to pay for health
care services have direct and substantial impact on the interstate
health care market.” Second, the
“minimum coverage provision is
essential to the Act’s larger regulation of the interstate business
of health insurance.”2
Both of these elements are essential to the holding. If there is
no individual activity that directly
and substantially affects interstate commerce, Congress cannot
act. And if there is no broader
statutory scheme regulating interstate commerce, then the federal law will fail the constitutional test, as other laws have done.3,4
For reasons that the U.S. District Court in Michigan found
relatively obvious, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
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(ACA) satisfies the first of these
two requirements. As Judge Steeh
noted, the health care market is
unlike any other market, because
there is no way that “living breathing beings” can opt out of it. Everyone needs health care at some
point, and thus all of us are market purchasers, however reluctantly. How individuals buy health
care is fundamentally a matter
that affects the health care system nationwide.
But in order to be constitutional, a federal law must satisfy
the second test: Congress must
intervene in a manner that rises
to the level of a broader regulatory scheme. Health care reform
represents just such an intervention, offering a comprehensive
redesign of the U.S. health insurance market. The law fundamentally transforms health insurance from a product designed
to preserve profitability in the face
of rampant adverse selection to
a regulated industry whose long-
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term strength and stability are
essential to the public interest
and that, in its restructured form,
will therefore take on certain
characteristics of a public utility.4,5
The redesign of U.S. health insurance to advance the national
public interest addresses two profound threats to the survival of a
functional health care system that
is capable of serving Americans’
needs. The first problem is that
tens of millions of people are uninsured, either as a matter of a
deliberate choice or as the result
of financial or health-related exclusionary barriers. The second
problem, triggered by the first, is
rampant shifting of costs onto
millions of other Americans who
have chosen to be insured and are
fortunate enough to be able to
obtain coverage.
Of course, the individual mandate is central to the legislative
scheme, since without a large pool
of healthy adults and children, it
is simply impossible to create the
market conditions for stable health
insurance — a fact that is universally recognized by economics experts. But if the ACA stopped at
mandating coverage — leaving
Americans to fend for themselves
in finding products that would
adequately finance health care for
them and their families — it might
not achieve the stature essential to
a broad regulatory scheme.
The ACA represents a constitutional intervention into the
health insurance market because
of a combination of five results
that it achieves. First, and perhaps most fundamentally, in a
remarkable shift whose precedent
lies in the watershed Civil Rights
Act of 1964, the ACA transforms
health insurance into a public accommodation. The Civil Rights
Act barred private businesses such
as hotels, bus companies, and
1882

restaurants from refusing to sell
their products or services to customers on the basis of race. The
ACA bars state-licensed health
insurers from refusing to sell
products to individuals on the
basis of health status. This prohibition, which bars rescissions
— the canceling of policies of
people who become ill — and
which applies at both the point
of initial sale and the point of
renewal, is binding on health insurers nationwide, regardless of
whether they sell their products
in the open market or through
state health insurance exchanges.
This basic reconceptualization
of health insurance as a good
whose availability is a matter of
national public interest essentially
frames health insurance the way
the Civil Rights Act framed other business interests.
Second, the ACA establishes
minimum national standards governing the design of health insurance sold in the individual and
group-plan markets, as well as the
design of self-insured employersponsored plans. In all insurance
markets, these standards include
bans against excessive waiting
periods and against the imposition of annual and lifetime coverage limits, a requirement to
cover preventive services with no
cost sharing, and a requirement
to cover routine medical costs
associated with participation in
clinical trials. In the individual
and small-group markets, design
regulation reaches further, specifying a minimum level of coverage for “essential health benefits” and limits on exposure to
out-of-pocket costs for those essential benefits. Equally important are new rules that, according to a strategy of measuring
the medical loss ratio (the proportion of money collected in
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premiums that is actually spent
on medical care), position the industry for greater price regulation
as a result of increased transparency of cost increases and
their justifications.
Third, the ACA creates a nationwide system of health insurance exchanges serving the individual and small-group markets
and gives states the option to
expand their exchanges to reach
larger groups. The law encourages states to establish and operate
their own exchanges but guarantees access to a federally administered exchange in states that
elect not to do so. Health insurance sold through exchanges will
be subject to “qualified health
plan” requirements, which are
aimed at ensuring not only the
integrity of coverage, but also,
by stipulating that each plan’s
provider network must be adequate, the availability of affordable health care itself.
Fourth, the ACA establishes a
uniform, national subsidy system
that ensures Medicaid coverage
for the poorest Americans and
advance tax credits for insurance
premiums for individuals and
families who are not eligible for
Medicaid but have low-to-moderate incomes. States, of course,
participate in Medicaid on a voluntary basis, but all participating
states will be required to extend
coverage to newly eligible individuals, just as many previous
Medicaid reforms have created
new mandatory categories of beneficiaries. In this case, the new
expectations are accompanied by
considerable new funding.
Finally, the ACA uses the platform of uniform, stable financing
to begin to change health care
itself, on a nationwide basis. The
law provides for a major investment in primary care through an
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expansion of federally qualified
health centers. This investment is
coupled with a series of health
care cost-cutting measures, as well
as the establishment of national
frameworks for quality improvement and public health and prevention, as well as pilot and demonstration projects that aim to
improve the quality and efficiency of health care for the entire
population over time.
The fundamental goal of the
ACA is no less than the preservation of the U.S. health care system. In a country that depends

on health insurance to finance
care, preservation cannot happen
without a comprehensive regulatory scheme that reaches from
coast to coast and sets the minimum rules of market entry and
operation for health insurers. The
glide path to this new system is
long and complex, but the law’s
end point is clear and visionary,
and its constitutionality — at
least in this first round — is incontrovertible.
Disclosure forms provided by the author
are available with the full text of this article at NEJM.org.
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F

ew undertakings in the short
history of the implementation of health care reform have
been as difficult or contentious
as the drafting of regulations to
define the statute’s “medical loss
ratio” requirement. Beginning in
2011, health insurers must report annually the percentage of
their premium revenue (excluding
expenditures for taxes and regulatory fees) that they spend on
“reimbursement for clinical services” and on “activities that improve health care quality.” This
is their medical loss ratio. If the
medical loss ratio of an insurer
in the individual or small-group
market falls below 80% (or, for
large-group insurers, 85%), the insurer must rebate to its enrollees
the difference between the reported ratio and the target percentage.
Traditionally, medical loss ratios were of interest only to investors. An insurer with a low or
“favorable” ratio was spending
less on health care and produc-

ing a greater profit, and thus represented a good investment. The
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) reverses the
incentives — too little spent on
health care or quality improvement results in a rebate. The purpose of the statute, however, is
not to produce rebates, but rather
to give insurers an incentive to
become more efficient. Some insurers currently spend as little as
60% of their premium revenues
on health care.1 The law should
change that. It will also increase
transparency — consumers will
see how much of their premium
dollars is actually spent on health
care, which is, after all, why consumers buy insurance.
In an unusual move, Congress
delegated to the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
(NAIC) the task of establishing
the definitions and methods to
be used for calculating loss ratios. The NAIC, for which I serve
as a consumer representative, has
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traditionally coordinated state regulatory efforts to make insurance
regulation more uniform. Rarely,
however, has it been called on to
draft regulations for the federal
government.
Given the special expertise of
the state insurance commissioners in insurance regulation, as
well as the spirit of cooperative
federalism that underlies the
health care reform law, asking the
NAIC to draft the regulations
made sense. But under the ACA,
the Department of Health and
Human Services (DHHS) reserves
the responsibility for “certifying”
the NAIC’s proposal before it becomes federal law.
The NAIC began the task of
drafting the loss-ratio regulation
soon after the reform law was
adopted, appointing two working
groups of regulators. One drafted
the form that insurers will use
to report loss ratios. This group
also defined the categories of
expenses that will be reported.
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